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Abstract
This report contains an overview of two related areas of research in cryptography
which have been prolific in significant advances in recent years. The first of
these areas is pairing based cryptography. Bilinear pairings over elliptic curves
were initially used as formal mathematical tools and later as cryptanalysis tools
that rendered supersingular curves insecure. In recent years, bilinear pairings
have been used to construct many cryptographic schemes. The second area
covered by this report is identity based cryptography. Digital certificates are
a fundamental part of public key cryptography, as one needs a secure way of
associating an agent’s identity with a random (meaningless) public key. In
identity based cryptography, public keys can be arbitrary bit strings, including
readable representations of one’s identity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This report contains an overview of two related areas of research in cryptography
which have been prolific in significant advances in recent years. The first of
these areas is pairing based cryptography. Bilinear pairings over elliptic curves
were initially used as formal mathematical tools and later as cryptanalysis tools
that rendered supersingular curves insecure. In recent years, bilinear pairings
have been used to construct many cryptographic schemes, the most notorious
of which is Boneh and Franklin’s identity based encryption algorithm.
The second area covered by this report is identity based cryptography. Digi-
tal certificates are a fundamental part of public key cryptography, as one needs a
secure way of associating an agent’s identity with a random (meaningless) pub-
lic key. In identity based cryptography, public keys can be arbitrary bit strings,
including readable representations of one’s identity. Therefore, digital certifi-
cates are not necessary in an identity based scenario. The number of identity
based cryptographic primitives and schemes that have been proposed in the last
five years is also astounding. Whether or not large-scale identity based crypto-
graphic infrastructures will replace classical public key infrastructures, and in
which areas this is more likely to occur, is something that remains to be seen.
This work was carried out during a four months visit with the Cryptogra-
phy and Information Security Group, at the Department of Computer Science,
University of Bristol.
Acknowledgement Work funded by scholarship SFRH/BPD/20528/2004,
awarded by the Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia, Ministe´rio da Cieˆncia e
do Ensino Superior, Portugal.
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Chapter 2
Basic Notions
2.1 Hard problems
In this section, we list a set of hard problems used in cryptography. By hard
we mean problems for which no polynomial time algorithm is known.
2.1.1 General Problems
Factoring large numbers Given a large integer number n, find its prime
factorisation, such that n = Πpeii . The best known algorithm for factoring a
number with no small prime factors is the General Number Field Sieve, which
executes in sub exponential time.
RSA problem Given an RSA public key (n, e), such that n = p · q is the
product of two random large primes, and a ciphertext C = Me (mod n), to
compute M [39]. Clearly, this problem can be no harder than factoring the
modulus, since this reveals φ(n) = (p−1)∗(q−1) and allows for the calculation of
the private key d = e(−1) (mod φ(n)). The inverse relationship, i.e. is factoring
the modulus any harder than the RSA problem, is an open issue. However, it
is believed that the best attack on an RSA cryptosystem is to factor n.
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) Let (G, ∗) be a multiplicative group
of order n, and let h ∈ G such that h = gx for some unknown x ∈ Zn. Given
g and h, the discrete logarithm problem is to find x. For additive groups, such
as an elliptic curve, the problem definition is slightly different, since exponen-
tiation is effectively a scalar multiplication. If G = Zp, where p is prime, then
the best known algorithm is the index calculus method, which executes in sub-
exponential time. Over elliptic curves, and until recently, no sub-exponential
time algorithm was known to exist. However, recent developments, which also
led to the appearence of pairing based cryptography, have shown that for partic-
ular types of curves the DLP can be reduced to the same problem over a different
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group, over which the Index Calculus Method applies (see Section 4.2). P1363
[24] already includes an algorithm for avoiding such curves.
Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) Let a, b ∈ Z∗n, (G, ∗) a multiplicative
group of order n, and g ∈ G. Given g, ga, and gb, the Computational Diffie-
Hellman problem (CDHP) is to find h ∈ G such that h = gab. Clearly, this
problem can be no harder than the DLP, since solving the latter for a or b auto-
matically permits obtaining h. The reverse relation, i.e. is the DLP any harder
than the CDHP, is still an open problem, but work done in this area indicates
that the two problems might be equivalent.
Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) Let a, b ∈ Z∗n, (G, ∗) a mul-
tiplicative group of order n, and g, h ∈ G. Given g, ga, gb, and h, the Decision
Diffie-Hellman problem (DDHP) is to determine whether h = gab. This ia a
weaker variant of the CDHP. Again, it is clear that the DDHP can be no harder
than the CDHP. However, there are some groups for which it is known that
the CDHP is hard, but the DDHP is easy. Such groups are called Gap Diffie-
Hellman Groups. Nevertheless, for the general case, it is not clear whether the
DDHP is always easier than the CDHP.
Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (GDHP) Let a, b ∈ Z∗n, (G, ∗) a cyclic mul-
tiplicative group of prime order n, and g ∈ G. Given g, ga, and gb, the Gap
Diffie-Hellman problem (GDHP) is to solve the CDHP, possibly with help of a
decision Diffie-Hellman oracle. Note that this problem formulation is natural
in gap Diffie-Hellman groups, where the GDHP and the CDHP are equivalent,
since the DDHP oracle is readily available.
2.1.2 Problems Over Bilinear Groups
Consider a map tˆ : G1×G2 → GT , from multiplicative groups (G1, ∗) and G2.∗)
to another multiplicative group (GT , ∗), with all groups of prime order q. This
map is said to be a bilinear pairing, if it has the following properties:
• Linearity in the first argument: tˆ(x ∗ x, y) = tˆ(x, y) ∗ tˆ(x, y).
• Linearity in the second argument: tˆ(x, y ∗ y) = tˆ(x, y) ∗ tˆ(x, y).
• Non-degeneracy (strong): tˆ(x, y) = 1⇔ (x = 1) ∨ (y = 1).
If the pairing is defined such that G1 = G2 then it is said to be symmetric,
and asymmetric otherwise.
Consider the simpler case of a symmetric pairing. If there is an efficient
way of calculating such a bilinear map from G1 to GT , then the Decision Diffie-
Hellman problem in G1 is easy, although the Computational Diffie-Hellman
problem may still be hard [11]. In other words, we are able to build a gap Diffie
Hellman group.
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This is because we can calculate tˆ(ga, gb) and simply compare it to tˆ(g, h).
Due to the bi-linearity property, these values will be equal if and only if h = gab.
Note that because GT is cyclic, and the pairing is strongly non-degenerate,
tˆ(g, g) must be a generator for GT .
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) Let a, b, c ∈ Z∗n, (G1, ∗) be a
cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q, (GT , ∗) be a cyclic multiplicative
group of prime order q, tˆ : G1 × G1 → GT be a symmetrical bilinear pairing,
and g ∈ G1 be a generator such that tˆ(g, g) is also a generator of GT . Given
g, ga, gb and gc, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) is to compute
e(g, g)abc. The BDHP can be no harder than the CDHP in either group, since
the ability to solve the latter in any of them provides a trivial solution to the
former. See Section 6 for recent developments on this issue.
When dealing with asymmetric pairings of the form tˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT , the
previous definitions of the Diffie-Hellman and Gap-Diffie-Hellman problems are
not adequate [12]. This is because the domain of the pairing is formed out of
two different groups. Hence, the relevant issue is not solving DH in G1, but the
following problem over G1 and G2.
Co-Diffie-Hellman Problem (Co-DHP) Let a ∈ Z∗n, (G1, ∗) and (G2, ∗)
be cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order q, and g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 be
generators. Given g1, ga1 , g2, g
a
2 , and h ∈ G1 the Co-Diffie-Hellman Problem
(Co-DHP) is to compute ha.
If an isomorphism ρ : G2 → G1 exists and is efficiently computable, which
is usually the case, then this assumption can be relaxed, by ommiting ga2 , and
making g1 = ρ(g2).
Co-Decision-Diffie-Hellman Problem (Co-DHP) Let a, b ∈ Z∗n, (G1, ∗)
and (G2, ∗) be cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order n, and g1 ∈ G1 and
g2 ∈ G2 be generators. Given g1, ga1 , g2 and gb2 the Co-Decision-Diffie-Hellman
Problem (Co-DDHP) is to determine if a = b.
One calls a pair (G1, G2) a co-Gap-Diffie-Hellman pair, if the co-DHP is
hard, and the co-DDHP is easy for these groups. If we have a bilinear map
such as the one described above, then one must consider the problem of finding
pre-images of pairing values.
One Way Bilinearity (OWB) Given a random element Q ∈ GT , find a pair
(x, y) such that tˆ(x, y) = Q[10]. It is not clear how hard this problem actually
is in the case of the pairings used in identity based cryptography. However, it
is definitely not harder than a stricter version of this notion in which one of the
points in G1 or G2 if fixed.
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This notion has been disregarded until recently, despite being, as Joux noted
in is revised version of [27] fundamental to the understanding the security of
pairing based systems.
Let us assume, momentarily, that this problem is not hard in a particular
setting (G1, GT , tˆ : G1 × G1 → GT , P ), where P is a generator of G1. In
other words, assume that given g ∈ GT we are able to compute φg such that
tˆ(P, φ(g)) = g.
Suppose now that we want to solve the CDH problem in GT : we are given
ga and gb, and we want to calculate gab. By the pairing’s bilinearity, then we
must have φ(ga) = aφ(g) and φ(gb) = bφ(g).
Now forgetting about P , we have tˆ(φ(g), φ(g)) = gλ, and it is easy to cal-
culate gabλ = tˆ(φ(gb), φ(ga)). If q is prime, then we have λq−3 = λ−2 (mod q).
Additionally, it is easy to calculate gλ
q−3
using an addition chain for q − 3
and the pairing to construct the powers of g. Finally, one could calculate
gab = tˆ(φ(gabλ), φ(gλ
−2
)).
This leads to the conclusion that the latter form of OWB is at least as hard
as CDH in G2 (and consequently G1) when there is a bilinear pairing between
the two.
2.2 Security models
Central to any cryptographic primitive or protocol is an assessment of the se-
curity guarantees that it provides. The theoretical validation of these proper-
ties based on formal security requirements and adversary models, anchoring the
proofs of security on the assumption that it is unfeasible to solve a hard problem
is usually called provable security.
Provable security gained strength in public key cryptography, where the
internal structure of cryptographic primitives is a lot simpler, and security con-
jectures are usually based on arguments such as “assuming that the discrete
logarithm problem is hard”.
The first work in this area introduced security proofs very similar to com-
plexity theory reductions, which in addition to being quite elaborate, were only
applicable to cryptographic schemes that were not usable in practice.
In 1998. Bellare et al. [9] introduced the Random Oracle model, which
allows for simpler proofs, and simpler schemes. In this model, all parties have
access to a random function (the Random Oracle). Proofs carried out Random
Oracle model only apply to the real world if one assumes that cryptographic
hash functions are a valid implementation of a truly random function (or if one
considers only attacks where hash functions are viewed as random functions).
Today, opinions diverge as to the validity of proofs obtained in the RO model,
although the majority of cryptosystems for which security proofs are presented
are secure only in this setting. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that a proof
in the standard model is preferrable, but if it is not attainable, a proof in the
RO model is better than no proof at all.
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Public Key Encryption In [5], Bellare et al. sum up previous work to
establish the notions of security for public key encryption and the relations
between these notions. 1
The security of a public key encryption scheme is defined along two different
axis: one of them measures the security requirements for the scheme, or goals;
on the other one are the capabilities of the adversary, i.e. the nature of the
attack. Regarding the goals, we can have:
• Indistinguishability (IND) – this notion captures the intuition of a privacy
requirement. In a scheme satisfying this requirement it is unfeasible for
an adversary, given a cryptogram created from one of two possible clear
texts, to distinguish which clear text was actually used. This is also called
polynomial security, and it has been shown to be equivalent to semantic
security2.
• Non-malleability(NM) – this notion captures the intuition that a crypto-
graphic scheme must be tamper-proof. Given a cryptogram, an adversary
must be unable to produce another one, such that the corresponding clear
text is meaningfully-related with the original one (unknown to the adver-
sary).
Three types of attack are usually considered:
• Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) – The adversary can obtain ciphertexts
for plaintexts of her choice. In public key cryptography this is always
possible in practice, due to the public knowledge of the encryption key.
• Non-adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA1) – Same as CPA, but the
adversary has the additional capability of obtaining decryptions of chosen
ciphertexts, at some point prior to the time of the actual attack.
• Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2) – Same as CCA1, only that
the adversary has access to the decryption oracle at all times during the
attack (obviously it cannot ask for the decryption of the ciphertext on
which she is being challenged).
For a particular scheme, one can combine goals and attacks arbitrarily, which
leads to six different possibilities. Bellare et al. identify the relations between
these notions, both inside and outside the Random Oracle model. The most
interesting conclusion is that a scheme satisfying the IND-CCA2 requirement
will satisfy all others i.e. a scheme satisfying indistinguishability under an adap-
tive chosen ciphertext attack automatically satisfies all other combinations of
goals/attacks.
There is another type of goal, called One Way Encryption (OWE) [18], in
which the adversary has to gain advantage in a game where she is challenged
1We are not going to describe the symmetric counterparts of these notions, since they do
not apply to pairing-based cryptography. A discussion of this can be found in [7].
2The notion that a cryptogram reveals nothing of the clear text, apart from its length.
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with a specific ciphertext, and must present the corresponding cleartext. This
notion is weaker than the previous ones, since an adversary winning this game
will certainly be powerful enough to break the other types of attack.
These notions can also be considered in a multi-user setting [6].
Digital Signatures For digital signatures, the strongest and most widely used
security model is that of existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen
message attack (UF-CMA) [21].
The concept of existential unforgeability means that it is infeasible for the
adversary to present a valid signature for any message, under a particular set
of parameters, namely a public key.
In an adaptive chosen message attack, the adversary is provided with a
signing oracle, from which she may request an arbitrary number of signatures,
for all messages except the one that she presents to win the game.
Identification Secure identification schemes are based on interactive (possi-
bly zero knowledge) proofs of knowledge, whereby one party convinces another
of her identity, by demonstrating knowledge about a secret.
The security of identification schemes is defined based on the concept of
impersonation (IMP), for different types of attacks: passive attacks (PA), active
attacks (AA) and concurrent attacks (CA) [8].
Impersonation, means that the prover (the party being identified) is able to
make the verifier (the party performing the identification) accept a false identity
claim with non-negligible probability.
In a passive attack (PA), the adversary is not allowed to interact with the
system before attempting an impersonation. In an active attack (AA), the
adversary is allowed to interact with the prover, several times, posing as verifier.
Finally, in concurrent attacks (CA), the attacker is able to perform several active
attacks in parallel, i.e. several sessions may occur simultaneously.
2.3 Elliptic Curves
Informally, an elliptic curve is the locus of points in the x-y plane that satisfy
an algebraic equation of the form y2 = Ax3+Bx2+Cx+D. The values x and y
may represent different things, namely elements of the sets R, C, Q, or a finite
field Fp.
These curves are not ellipses. Their name comes from a particular type of
integral that arises from calculating the length of arcs in ellipses, called elliptic
integrals. An elliptic integral is of the form∫
dx√
4x3 − g2x− g3
(2.1)
Elliptic integrals are generalisations of inverse trigonometric functions. Over
complex numbers, elliptic integrals are multivalued, and are only well-defined
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modulo a period lattice i.e. there are two independent periods involved in the
repetition pattern. This means that the values taken by elliptic integrals can
be considered to be on a torus, just like the joint positions of the pointers in a
clock.
This implies that the inverse function of an elliptic integral is a doubly
periodic function. This type of function is called an elliptic function.
Elliptic functions, like every doubly-periodic function with periods that are
independent over R, satisfy an equation of the form
℘′2 = 4℘3 − g2℘− g3 (2.2)
for some constants g2 and g3.
If we consider the pair (℘′, ℘) to be a point, then the solutions to Eq. 2.2
provide a map from a torus to the curve
Y 2 = 4X3 − g2X − g3 (2.3)
which is an example of an elliptic curve.
General elliptic curves are defined over a field K. Let K¯ be its algebraic
closure and K∗ its multiplicative group. An elliptic curve over K is defined as
the set of solutions in the projective plane P2(K¯) of a homogeneous Weierstrass
equation of the form
E : Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z2 = X3 + a2X2Z + a4XZ2 + a6Z3 (2.4)
with a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K.
In other words, we’ve got a cubic homogeneous (all terms with the same
degree) equation with three variables. Solutions are seen as homogeneous co-
ordinates in a projective plane over the algebraic closure of K.
A projective plane is an abstract concept in which points can be located
using homogeneous co-ordinates. In terms of the solutions to the equation, a
projective plane over K¯ provides a locus for all possible solutions, including
points at infinity. 3
Considering a field Kˆ such that K ⊆ Kˆ ⊆ K¯, a point (X,Y, Z) (with
X,Y, Z ∈ K¯) on the curve is said to be Kˆ-rational if the projection of the
solution back to Euclidean co-ordinates gives a point in Kˆ. For that we must
have (X,Y, Z) = α(Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ) with Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ ∈ Kˆ.
Note that the curve has only one Kˆ-rational point at infinity. By setting
Z = 0 we get X = 0 meaning that all points in the Y axis map to the same
Kˆ-rational point, which is called the point at infinity O.
3In order to capture the concept of infinity in the solution to polynomial equations, a
“trick” is used. Instead of using (X,Y ) co-ordinates in Euclidean space, which do not allow
for infinity representation, a homogeneous co-ordinate system is used, which includes a third
co-ordinate and looks like (X/W,Y/W,W ). Whenever W = 0 we’ve got infinity (actually it
is a line in infinity where parallel planes meet). In order to obtain a one-to-one relationship
to the original co-ordinate system, all points in the homogeneous co-ordinate system whose
co-ordinates are proportional, are considered to be equivalent: points become lines.
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When working with Euclidean co-ordinates, we use the affine form for the
equation:
E : Y 2 + a1XY + a3Y = X3 + a2X2 + a4X + a6 (2.5)
This equation can be further simplified if the characteristic of K is not 2 or
3. In this case, it can be rewritten as:
E : Y 2 = X3 + aX + b (2.6)
From this point on, and for the sake of simplicity, we will stick to the use of
affine coordinates, and to fields of characteristic greater than 3 (finite fields), so
that we can use Equation 2.6.
For a particular curve, the j-invariant is defined as
j(E) =
2833a3
4a3 + 27b2
this quantity is preserved, even when the curve is subject to a change of vari-
ables.
A related quantity is the curve descriminant, which is defined as
∆(E) = −16(4a3 + 27b2)
When this in non-zero, then the left side of Equation 2.6 has three distinct roots,
and the curve is non-singular.
If the field underlying an elliptic curve is algebraic closed, a straight line
will intercept the curve at three points (counting tangents as multiple roots). If
two of these points are known, then the third can be found. Furthermore, if a
straight line intercepts an elliptic curve in two K-rational points, then the third
point is also K-rational.
Let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2(x2, y2) be two points in a non-singular elliptic
curve. Then, the third point in which the line through P1 and P2 intercepts the
curve is given by P3 = (x3, y3), such that
x3 = λ2 − x2 − x2
y3 = λ(x3 − x1) + y1
λ =
{ y1−y2
x1−x2 for x1 6= x2
y1−y2
x1−x2 for x1 = x2
(2.7)
The set of K-rational points of an elliptic curve, including the point at
infinity O form an additive group, which we denote by E(K). The addition
operation is constructed based on the previous observations, by defining that
P1 + P2 + P3 = O ⇔ P1 + P2 = −P3
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Removing the minus from the previous equation, all of this can be written as:
P3 = (x3, y3) = (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = P1 + P2
x3 = λ2 − x2 − x2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
λ =
{ y1−y2
x1−x2 for x1 6= x2
y1−y2
x1−x2 for x1 = x2
(2.8)
Finally, we have −P = (x,−y) and P + (−P ) = O.
A natural extension of the addition operation is scalar multiplication. We
define the multiplication-by-m [m]P operation as
[m]P = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
for m > 0,
[0]P = O and [−m]P = [m](−P ).
This operation is equivalent to exponentiation in multiplicative groups, and it
is the basis for the problem underlying elliptic curve cryptography: the discrete
logarithm problem over elliptic curves (ECDLP). This is the problem of, given
a point Q = [d]P and P , find the scalar d. As mentioned in Section 2.1, over
carefully chosen elliptic curves, the ECDLP is a hard problem for which no
sub-exponential time algorithm is known. This makes it possible to implement
elliptic curve cryptosystems using smaller parameter sizes, for the same security
level.
Based on the multiplication-by-m operation, we can also define the order of
an elliptic curve point P as the smallest positive integer m such that [m]P = O.
If no such integer exists, then the order is said to be infinite.
This, in turn leads to the definition of the subgroup of n-torsion points in
an elliptic curve. A point P for which [n]P = O is said to be an n-torsion
point. Note that this happens only for points whose order divides n. The set of
n-torsion points in an elliptic curve is given by
E(K)[n] = {P ∈ E(K) : [n]P = O}
and it is a subgroup of E(K).
Consider the case in which K = Fq. The order of the group of points of the
elliptic curve E(Fq), written #E(Fq), satisfies the following equation
#E(Fq) = q + 1− t
where t is called the trace of Frobenius (or simply the trace of the curve),
satisfying the so-called Hasse bound :
|t| ≤ 2√q.
An elliptic curve is said to be supersingular if the characteristic of the base
field p divides the trace t.
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The group structure of E(Fq) is rather complex. An interesting result con-
cerns the sub-groups of n-torsion points. If n and q are relatively prime, then
E[n] is isomorphic to the Zn ⊕ Zn. If n = pe, where p is the characteristic of
Fq, then either E[n] = {O} if the curve is supersingular, or E[n] is isomorphic
to Zpe otherwise [44].
This result has two important consequences. Firstly, if n and q are relative
prime then |E[n]| = n2. Secondly, if n is prime, E[n] is generated by any two
linearly independent n-torsion points.
Finally, the Frobenius Endomorphism or Frobenius map in an elliptic curve
E(Fq) is defined as
Φ : E → E
Φ(x, y) = (xq, yq)
Φ(O) = O
Note that if we have Fq ⊆ K then, for a point P ∈ E(K), we have
Φ(P ) = P ⇔ P ∈ E(Fq).
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Chapter 3
Pairings
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we describe how bilinear maps such as the ones defined in the
previous chapter are implemented over elliptic curves. There are two construc-
tions that can be used for this purpose: the Weil Pairing and the Tate Pairing.
Their definitions are based on divisor theory [44, 32], so we will briefly describe
the relevant aspects of this in the first part of this chapter.
3.2 Divisor Theory: The Very Basics
Take an elliptic curve E(K) where K = Fq in Weierstrass form
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6
The coordinate ring K[E] of E over K is defined as the quotient ring
K[x, y]/I(E)
where I(E) is the ideal formed by all polynomials with coefficients in K which
are zero at all points of E.
Another way to put this is the following. Define the function r ∈ K[x, y] as
r(x, y) = y2 + a1xy + a3y − x3 − a2x2 − a4x− a6.
The ideal I(E) is now the ideal in K[x, y] generated by r. By considering
fractions of K[E], we obtain the function field K(E).
These definitions can also be extended to the algebraic closure of the field
K, denoted by K.
We call an element of K(E) a rational function. A rational function f is
said to be defined at a point P if its denominator does not evaluate to 0 at point
P . In this case, the evaluation of the f at point P is obtained by taking the
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quotient between its numerator and its denominator when they are evaluated
at the coordinates of P . If a function is not defined at a point P , then we say
it has a pole in P . If the function is defined in P and its numerator evaluates
to 0, then we say that the function has a zero in P . A rational function has a
finite number of poles and zeros.
Evaluation of a rational function at infinity (O) if obtained by comparing
the degrees of the numerator and denominator, as usual. However, in this
case, because of the relation between variables x and y established by the curve
equation, their degrees are set at 2 and 3 respectively.
In order to define the concept of a divisor, one needs first to address the
problem of pole and zero multiplicity. For each point in the elliptic curve P ∈ E
there exists a rational functions u such that u(P ) = 0 and every rational function
f ∈ K(E) can be written as f = uds. The function f is called a uniformizing
parameter at P .
The interesting thing is that d does not depend on the actual function u and
its value is called the order of f at P , denoted d = ordP (f). For zeros, the
order will be positive. For poles, the order will be negative. For all other points,
the order will be zero. The multiplicity of a pole or zero P in f is the absolute
value of the order of f at P .
The poles and zeros of a rational function completely define it up to a con-
stant factor. To keep track of the poles and zeros of rational function, we use
divisors. A divisor D is a formal sum of points of the form
D =
∑
P∈E
nP 〈P 〉
with nP ∈ Z and non-zero for only a finite number of points. Note that the sum
is not associated with elliptic curve addition, and the nP value is not elliptic
curve scalar multiplication. The purpose of a divisor is not to be evaluated to a
single point in the elliptic curve, but to associate “weights” to elements in lists
of elliptic curve points. In some cases, divisors represent the orders of rational
functions at relevant points. The divisor of a function f is defined as
div(f) =
∑
P∈E
ordP (f)〈P 〉
The set of all divisors generated by the points in a curve E is denoted Div(E).
One can naturally define divisor addition over this set as∑
P∈E
nP 〈P 〉+
∑
P∈E
mP 〈P 〉 =
∑
P∈E
(nP +mP )〈P 〉
obtaining an abelian group.
Other useful notions associated with divisors are the following:
• The support of a divisor is the set of points for which nP is not zero.
• The degree of a divisor is the sum of all nP .
13
• The set of all divisors of degree 0 form a subgroup under divisor addition,
denoted by Div0(E).
• A divisor D is called principal if D = div(f) for some rational function
f .
• Two divisors D1 and D2 are said to be (linearly) equivalent, denoted D1 ∼
D2, if D1 −D2 is principal. Intuitively, D1 is D2 away from representing
the divisor of some rational function f .
• A divisor D is principal if and only if it has degree 0 and the weighted
sum (using nP as scalar point multiplications) of the points in its support
add up to O.
• The set of all principal divisors in Div(E) is denoted Prin(E).
• The set of all divisors in Div(E) which are not principal is represented by
the Picard group or divisor class group defined as
Pic(E) = Div(E)/Prin(E).
• Every degree zero divisor is equivalent to 〈P 〉 − 〈O〉 for some P ∈ E.
• The evaluation of a rational function f in a divisor D satisfying the re-
striction that the support of D and the support of the divisor of f share
no common points, is defined as follows:
f(D) =
∏
P∈D
f(P )nP
• Weil’s reciprocity law states that f(div(g)) = g(div(f)).
• Constant factors do not affect the evaluation of a function at a divisor,
i.e. if f2 = cf2, then f2(D) = f1(D).
3.3 The Weil Pairing
There are two different, although related definitions of the Weil pairing. The
first definition, as given in [44] serves a theoretical role in literature. The second
definition, as given in [11] for example, allows for an efficient implementation
and is therefore more suitable for pairing based cryptography. Here, we will
focus on the latter. For a good description of both definitions and the relation
between them refer to [32].
Let r be an integer co-prime to the field characteristic p, and let S and T
be r-torsion points. Let also A and B be divisors such that A ∼ 〈S〉 − 〈O〉 and
B ∼ 〈T 〉 − 〈O〉, and A and B have disjoint support.
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Note that because S and T are in E[r], this means that rA and rB are
principal divisors, so there are fA, fB ∈ K(E) such that
div(fA) = rA and div(fB) = rB.
In this setting, the Weil pairing eˆr : E[r]×E[r]→ µr, where µr denotes the
group of r-th roots of unity in K, is given by
eˆr(S, T ) =
fA(B)
fB(A)
.
The value of the Weil pairing is independent of the choice of divisors A and
B, and functions fA and fB . The Weil pairing satisfies the following properties:
• Linearity in the first factor: eˆr(S1 + S2, T ) = eˆr(S1, T )eˆr(S2, T ).
• Linearity in the second factor: eˆr(S, T1 + T2) = eˆr(S, T1)eˆr(S, T2).
• Identity: eˆr(S, S) = 1.
• Alternation: eˆr(S, T ) = eˆr(T, S).
• Non-degeneracy: eˆr(S, T ) = 1, ∀S ∈ E[r] ⇒ T = O.
3.4 The Tate Pairing
Just as we can construct K = Fq as the quotient group Z/qZ, we can apply
the same principle to E(K), and construct E(K)/rE(K). The elements of this
quotient group are cosets of E(K).
We call CO the coset obtained by multiplying every point in E(K) by an r
such that E[r] 6= {}, because this coset is guaranteed to contain O. All other
cosets in the quotient group can be generated by adding a point that is not in
CO to all the points in this coset. The number of elements in CO is #E(K)/r
and, in this way, it is possible to split E(K) into r distinct cosets of order r,
which are the elements of E(K)/rE(K).
If r is prime, then we have r2 r-torsion points in E(K). However, we may
have either r or r2 of these points in the curve over K. If E[r] * E(K), then
each co-set will have exactly one r-torsion point. If E[r] ⊆ E(K), then each
co-set will have exactly r2 r-torsion point.
The Tate pairing definition also uses divisors and the evaluation of rational
functions over devisors. Let P ∈ E(Fqk)[r], where k is a suitable extension size
called the Tate embedding degree. In practice, r is usually a large prime dividing
the order of the curve, and k is the smallest integer such that r|(qk − 1). As
before, the divisor r〈P 〉 − r〈O〉 is principal, and we can find a rational function
g for it.
Now let Q be a point representing a coset in E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk), andD a degree
zero divisor with support disjoint than that of div(g), such that D ∼ 〈Q〉−〈O〉.
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In this setting, the Tate pairing is defined as
tˆr : E(Fqk)[r]× E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk)→ F∗qk/(F∗qk)r
tˆr(P,Q) = g(D).
Note that the codomain of the Tate pairing is also a quotient group where
each element is a co-set. This means that a result produced by the Tate pairing,
although constrained to a given coset, may not be unique. Each coset, must be
seen as an equivalence class. The equivalence relation is given by
a ≡ b⇔ a = bcr , with a, b, c ∈ Fqk .
In cryptographic applications it is usually the case that one needs pairing
results to be exactly reproducible. For this reason, Tate pairing calculations are
usually followed by an exponentiation to the power of (qk − 1)/r that removes
the r-th power ambiguity and produces an r-th root of unity. An alternate
definition for the Tate pairing is therefore
tˆ′r : E(Fqk)[r]× E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk)→ µr
tˆ′r(P,Q) = g(D)
(qk−1)/r.
Both definitions of the Tate pairing are well-defined and the result does
not depend on the choice of g and D. The Tate pairing satisfies the following
properties:
• Linearity in the first factor: tˆr(P1 + P2, Q) = tˆr(P1, Q)tˆr(P2, Q).
• Linearity in the second factor: tˆr(P,Q1 +Q2) = tˆr(P,Q1)tˆr(P,Q2).
• Identity: tˆr(O, Q) = 1.
• Non-degeneracy:
∀P ∈ E[r] , ∃Q ∈ E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk) such that tˆr(P,Q) 6= 1.
Note that, contrary to what occurs with the Weil pairing, tˆr(P, P ) may
not be the identity. However, if k > 1, then this will always be the case [19].
Furthermore, if r is prime, P 6= O and Q is linearly independent from P , then
the Tate pairing is non-trivial.
3.5 Embedding Degrees
The definitions of the Weil and Tate pairings over an elliptic curve E(Fq) imply
extensions of the field Fq.
In the case of the Weil pairing, the domain requires two independent r-
torsion points and the co-domain is the group of r-th roots of unity in the
algebraic closure of Fq. So, the minimum extension size we need is the smallest
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extension such that the curve E(Fqkw contains all the r-torsion points and the
field extension Fqkw contains all r-th roots of unity. We call this minimum
extension size the Weil embedding degree and denote it kw.
For the Tate pairing, r is required to be co-prime to q, and the domain and
co-domain require an extension of degree k, such that k is the smallest integer
satisfying m|(qk − 1). We call this value of k the Tate embedding degree, and
denote it kt.
It is interesting that the definition of the Tate embedding degree is also
a necessary and sufficient condition [32] for µr ⊆ Fqkt . The Weil embedding
degree may be larger than this, as we need all the r-torsion points, but this is
only possible happens for kt = 1. For all other values of kt we have kw = kt = k.
For this reason, one usually just talks about the embedding degree of the curve.
3.6 Distortion Maps
The properties of both the Tate pairing and the Weil pairing imply that in order
to have a non-trivial pairing value different from unity, one needs an efficient way
of finding linearly independent r-torsion points. Supersingular curves provide
an interesting feature in this context, which permits doing just that, as they
permit the construction of distortion maps [46].
Let P be an r-torsion point in the elliptic curve E(Fq) with r co-prime to
q. A distortion map with respect to P is an endomorphism φ that maps P to
a point φ(P ) which is linearly independent from P . Note that, since we are
dealing with an endomorphism, the point at infinity does not admit a distortion
map. Also, through the endomorphism structure we know that the value of
φ(P ) is still an r-torsion point.
Distortion maps do not exist for non-supersingular elliptic curves. However,
when implementing pairing based protocols using supersingular curves, distor-
tion maps are quite handy. In particular, they allow for the construction of
modified pairings (or symmetric pairings) which take both parameters from the
same group G1, simply by using
eˆ(P, φ(Q))
where both P and Q are in the same group G1.
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Chapter 4
Efficient implementation
4.1 Background
The fact that the Weil pairing is usually assumed to require a workload equiv-
alent to that of two Tate pairing calculations, has relegated the former to a
secondary role in the implementation of pairing-based cryptosystems. Never-
theless, as will be pointed out in Section 6 Koblitz and Menezes have recently
suggested that the Weil pairing is preferable for higher security levels, since it
does not require the final exponentiation to obtain a unique result.
Efficiency in pairing-based cryptosystems comes down to a trade-off between
three parameters: security level, computational load and bandwidth. These
parameters can be directly linked to the sizes of the groups over which the
pairings are calculated, as well as the sizes of the base field and its extension.
The following conditions must be met:
• For the DLP and CDH problems to be hard in E(Fq), we must have
log(q) ≥ 160 [4]. Note that we have q = pg, where p is the characteristic
of the field.
• For the DLP and DH problems to be hard in Fqk , we must have log(q)∗k ≥
1024 [4].
• For the BDHP to be hard, the size r of the groups over which the pairing
is operating is typically a large prime divisor of the order of the elliptic
curve, or the order itself. This must be a prime of at least 160 bits [20],
and it is usually expected to be of the same magnitude as q [37].
Nevertheless there is some flexibility in choosing adequate values for q and
k. In general, a small value for k implies a larger base field, which will bring
added costs, not only to the pairing calculations, but also to the elliptic curve
implementation. On the other hand, larger values of k imply additional com-
plexity in dealing with the field extensions. Finally, bandwidth issues are very
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dependent on the characteristics of the target cryptosystem. However, it is usu-
ally the case that because larger values of k allow for smaller elliptic curve point
representations, this will also bring overall bandwidth gains.
4.2 To go or not to go supersingular
Supersingular elliptic curves have very rich internal structure, and are very easy
to construct. This has made them an obvious choice for the implementation
of elliptic curve cryptosystems. However, their particular characteristics made
some authors suspicious that this type of curve might be an easier target for
attacks. This was confirmed when the MOV attack was published in 1993 [34]
and later, in 1994, when when the F-R attack [17] appeared.
These attacks use pairings to reduce the DLP over an elliptic curve, to the
DLP over an extension of the base field, for which sub-exponential time al-
gorithms are known. The attack is only viable on particular types of curves,
namely those over which the size of the required extension field is small. How-
ever, for supersingular curves this is always the case, which means that for
acceptable levels of security, supersingular curves require larger base field sizes.
When pairing-based cryptosystems appeared, supersingular curves were once
again considered for the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. The fact
that they are easy to construct and that distortion maps exist only for super-
singular curves makes them ideal for this type of application.
The above mentioned distrust for supersingular curves, and the need for
higher values of the embedding degree has led researchers to look at the problem
of generating suitable non-supersingular curves for pairing based cryptosystems.
MNT curves [36] [42] are elliptic curves of prime order, which are built using the
Complex Multiplication (CM) method, and that can be generated with specific
embedding degree values.
These curves have the advantage that the prime order subgroup that is
used for pairing calculations is the curve itself, thus minimizing the associated
co-factor. They have, however, the disadvantage that it is not possible to ob-
tain modified versions of the pairings, where non-degeneracy is guaranteed, and
where both pairing parameters come from the same group. This, in turn, makes
it less straightforward to implement pairing-based cryptosystems over MNT
curves [37].
4.3 Base field and field extensions
The size of the extension field over which the pairing is calculated is central to
the efficiency of the pairing calculation. Recall from the previous chapter that,
for the Tate pairing, the required extension field must contain all the lth roots
of unity. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that k be the smallest
integer such that l|(qk − 1) [1]. In the case of the Weil pairing, the condition
that must be met by the extension field is that it contains all elements of order l.
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The required extension size is generally greater or equal than that required for
the Tate pairing. However, the results in [1] indicate that the extension fields
required for both pairings are usually the same [19], and this is always true if
k > 1.
The implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems is usually based on two
types of base fields: fields of characteristic 2, i.e. extensions of F2n ; or fields
of large prime characteristic, i.e. Fp. The most efficient implementations op-
erate over binary fields, and take advantage of well-known optimisations that
are particularly suited for hardware implementation. On the other hand, the
efficient implementation of arithmetic modulo large primes has been extensively
studied for the implementation of cryptosystems not based on elliptic curves. It
was natural to take advantage of these developments in the implementation of
elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Extensions of F3 had not been considered interesting enough until pairing-
based cryptography came into the picture. This new interest is to the fact
that, for supersingular curves over F2n , it is not possible to obtain values of
k > 4. However, if one considers supersingular curves over F3n , it is possible to
maximize the value of k, obtaining an optimum value of 6 1.
This has prompted several authors to investigate the adaptation of opti-
misations used over other types of fields, to the particular case of fields of
characteristic three [4] [37]. Examples of this are efficient point tripling algo-
rithms, triple-and-add adaptations for efficient scalar multiplication, square root
extraction, etc.
Galbraith et al. [20] propose additional optimisation techniques, particularly
in what concerns the implementation of extension fields. These authors identify
as most relevant cases the implementation of extension fields F24m and F36m , as
these are the cases where the embedding degree is maximised. They propose
the following constructions:
• F = F2m is extended using a tower of two quadratic extensions: F1 =
F [x]/(x2 + x+ 1) ∼= F22m and F2 = F1[y]/(y2 + (x+ 1)y + 1) ∼= F24m .
• F = F3m is extended using a tower of a cubic extension and a quadratic
extension: F1 = F [a]/(a3−a+1) ∼= F33m and F2 = F1[b]/(b2+1) ∼= F36m .
In both cases, the trivial multiplication procedure is modified so as to min-
imise the number of multiplications over the underlying field. Division compu-
tations are optimised by using conjugates.
The work by Barreto et al. [2] in 2003 introduced a new approach to the
choice of groups forpairing calculation over non-supersingular curves. The au-
thors propose a mechanism for generating the point Q ∈ Fqk through a con-
struction that uses the twist of the curve over Fqd where k is even, and d = k/2.
The method consists in working over the twist of the curve in Fqd to obtain
a random point Q′. For a curve E given by y2 = x3 + ax + b, the twist over
Fqd is given by E′(Fqd) : y2 = x3 + v2ax+ v3b, for some quadratic non-residue
1For supersingular curves, k ≤ 6. [34]
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v ∈ Fqd . Since d = k/2, v will be a quadratic residue in Fqk , which means that
the map Ψ : (X,Y ) → (v−1X, (v√v)−1Y ) is an isomorphism that maps the
group of points of E′(Fqd) to a subgroup of points of E(Fqk). The point Q is
generated as Q = Ψ(Q′).
The fact that the x-coordinate of Q is in E′(Fqd) by construction, means
that the optimisations of Miller’s algorithm described in the next section, and
taken from [4], can be applied in this setting as well. Additionally, bandwidth
and processing can be saved by only explicitly calculating Q when the pairing
is evaluated. All other operations such as key generation, hashing and point
transmission can be carried out using only Fqd arithmetic.
4.4 Miller’s algorithm
All pairing implementations derive from an algorithm invented by Miller [35]
in 1985. This algorithm is basically a double-and-add procedure applied to the
construction of the rational functions required by the Weil and Tate pairings.
Recall that both the Weil and the Tate pairing definitions require the evalu-
ation of f(D), where f is a rational function with divisor of the form div(f) =
r〈P 〉 − r〈O〉, and D is a divisor with support disjoint than that of div(f).
Let fc be a rational function such that div(fc) = c〈P 〉− 〈[c]P 〉− (c− 1)〈O〉.
Miller’s algorithm is based on the observation that the desired function f can
be constructed using the following recurrence
fa+b = fa · fb · h[a]P,[b]P /h[a+b]P,−[a+b]P
where hU,V is the rational function given by the line through U and V . As
always, if U = V the line hU,U is the tangent in this point, and if either U = O
or V = O, then hU,V is the vertical line passing through the other point.
In the simpler case of the Tate pairing, where the aim is to construct a func-
tion g with divisor r〈P 〉 − r〈O〉, and P is an r torsion point, fr is exactly what
we need. 2 Using the previous recursion directly, one would need to maintain
representations of rational functions while constructing the required function g.
However, given that we only need the evaluation of this function at the divisor
D, this is not necessary. In fact, in Miller’s algorithm, the evaluation is accumu-
lated in each step of the recurrence, allowing for a very efficient implementation.
Figure 4.4 shows Miller’s algorithm for the Tate pairing evaluation.
4.5 Optimisation of Miller’s algorithm
In [4], Barreto et al. propose several optimisations to Miller’s algorithm for the
Tate pairing evaluation.
The first of these optimisations are based on the observation that for the
interesting supersingular elliptic curves in Table 4.5, (q− 1) is a factor of (qk −
2In the Weil pairing, several rational functions with this structure must be combined to
obtain the required fA and fB .
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Figure 4.1: Miller’s algorithm for the Tate pairing
f ← 1
V ← P
for i← t− 1, t− 2, ..., 1, 0 do
f ← f2 · gV,V (D)/g2V,−2V (D)
V ← 2V
if ri = 1
f ← f · gV,P (D)/gV+P,−(V+P )(D)
V ← V + P
end if
end for
return f
Table 4.1: Barreto et al.’s interesting supersingular curves
Curve Base field Curve order k
y2 = x3 + (1− b)x+ b, b ∈ {0, 1} Fp p+1 2
y2 + y = x3 + x+ b, b ∈ {0, 1} F2m 2m + 1± 2(m+1)/2 4
y2 = x3 − x+ b, b ∈ {−1, 1} F3m 3m + 1± 3(m+1)/2 6
1)/r, the exponent used to convert the result of the Tate pairing into an actual
root of unity. This leads to a theorem stating that in the calculation of the Tate
pairing for these curves, one can simply evaluate g(Q), followed by the usual
exponentiation. In [2], this optimisation is extended to the friendly groups
described in Section 4.3.
The second optimization applies to a subset of the curves in Table 4.5, and
to the modified version of the Tate pairing using distortion maps. Under these
special circumstances, Barreto et al. demonstrate that the denominators of the
rational functions used in Miller’s double-and-add algorithm can be ignored,
since they eventually evaluate to 1. In [2], this optimisation is extended to the
friendly groups described in Section 4.3, in the case where k is even.
Finally, Barreto et al. propose the use of a Solinas prime for r, which
minimises the number of non-doubling operations.
Galbraith et al. [20] also endorse this recommendation.. Alternatively, these
authors point out that the Tate pairing may be calculated, not in respect to
r, but in respect to the order of the curve, which may be advantageous if the
prime r does not have a low hamming weight. Note that, in this case, the
pairing values will be different, and so all users of a cryptosystem must follow
the same convention in this respect. Galbraith et al. [20] also provide a version
of Miller’s algorithm optimised for fields of characteristic three, and propose the
selection of the random point3 S, not from the curve over extended field, but
over the base field. This allows carrying out part of the calculations directly
over the base field, thereby speeding up the process.
3The point used to build a divisor equivalent to (Q)− (O)
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Other observations by these authors include the fact that all the line coeffi-
cients are over the base field (if P ’s coordinates are in the base field), and that
the calculation of the rational function may be performed so as to postpone all
divisions until the very end, at which point a single division provides the final
result.
Izu and Takagi [26] further elaborate on how to build on top of the previ-
ous improvements, by proposing optimisations for implementations over generic
curves i.e. not necessarily supersingular. These optimisations are based mostly
on clever manipulations of coordinate systems, and careful re-utilisation of pre-
computed quantities.
Scott and Barreto [41] propose an optimization that applies to the final
exponentiation in Tate pairing calculations when k is even. The exponent,
(q2 − 1)/r = (q + 1)(q − 1)/r can be partitioned into two factors (q − 1) and
(q + 1)/r.
Suppose that Fqk = Fk2d is implemented as a quadratic extension of Fqd ,
then we can represent an element of Fqk as x+ iy, where δ = i2 ∈ Fqd is some
quadratic non residue.
Scott and Barreto note that part of the final exponentiation can be efficiently
calculated as
(x+ iy)q−1 = (x+ iy)q/(x+ iy) = (x− iy)/(x+ iy).
Furthermore, a value a+ ib = (x+ iy)q−1 calculated in this way has a very
interesting property. These values are unitary, i.e. their norm, a2−δb2, is equal
to 1, and this means that exponentiations can be calculated very efficiently using
Lucas sequences.
These authors also propose a method for compressing pairing values that
leads to a bandwidth gain of roughly 50% when transferring pairing values.
This method operates roughly as elliptic curve point compression whereby only
one of the coordinates is transmitted and the other one is only defined up to a
sign.
In [16], Duursma and Lee generalise the work by Barreto et al. and by
Galbraith et al. to the hyperelliptic case, providing further optimisation for
the characteristic 3 case. Their algorithm is currently believed to be the most
efficient.
Restricting their work to the elliptic curve case, Duursma and Lee’s im-
provements apply to the following family of supersingular curves over fields of
characteristic three: E(Fq) : y2 = x3 − x + b, b ∈ −1, 1, q = 3n. The orders of
the groups in these curves N are well known, and have a very small ternary
expansion of the form 32m−1 ± 3m + 1, 2m − 1 = n. For l = N , the (Tate and
Weil) embedding degree is k = 6.
All the optimizations proposed by Barreto et al. [4] also apply to these
curves. The field extension is constructed using a cubic and a quadratic exten-
sion: Fq3 = Fq[ρ]/(ρ3− ρ− b) and Fq6 = Fq3 [σ]/(σ2+1). The distortion map is
given by: φ(Q) = φ(x, y) = (ρ− x, σy). Note that the x-coordinate is in Fq3 .
The real contribution of Duursma and Lee [16] is that they found a closed
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Figure 4.2: The Duursma-Lee algorithm for the Tate pairing
Input: point P = (x1, y1), point Q = (x2, y2)
Output: fP (φ(Q)) ∈ F∗q6/(F∗q6)3
3n+1
f ← 1
for i = 1 to m
x1 = x31, y1 = y
3
1
µ← x1 + x2 + b, λ← −y1y2σ − µ2
g ← λ− µρ− ρ3, f ← f ∗ g
x2 ← x1/32 , y2 ← y1/32
form for the Tate pairing, which permits breaking away from Miller’s algorithm
standard implementation.
The main observation in their work is that setting l = 33n + 1, we have
el(P,Q)3
3n−1 = eN (P,Q)(3
6n−1−1)/N . This turns l into a trivial ternary expan-
sion, which elliminates additions in Miller’s algorithm, but it makes the final
exponentiation a bit awckward. Duursma and Lee went on to show that the
increase in l’s bit length can be compensated by processing three trits at a
time, and providing a closed form for the Tate pairing, which greatly simplifies
implementations.
The algorithm is described in Figure 4.5, as found in [22]. Note that two
cubings and two cubic roots are required in each iteration.
Granger et al. [23] tackle the problem of finding the unique representative of
the quotient group avoiding the final exponentiation by 33n − 1, which requires
a division. What is achieved is a compression technique, whereby the represen-
tative of the quotient group is stored using only a value in Fq3 . This method
has the advantage that subsequent operations over the pairing value, computed
over this representation, provide a significant efficiency gain.
In [22] the same authors investigate optimal implementations of the cubing
and cubic root operations over fields of characteristic three required by the
algorithm in Figure 4.5 by using normal bases.
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Chapter 5
Identity-based
Cryptography
5.1 Background
Identity based cryptography was proposed by Shamir [43] in 1985. The problem
that this author addressed was the need for multiple interactions between users
using public key cryptography.
Typical use of digital signatures and asymmetric ciphers implies the ex-
change of public key certificates between the parties, since that is the only way
random public keys can be trustfully associated with one’s identity. Shamir’s
idea consists of using a readable representation of the identity as the public key,
thereby eliminating the need for public key certificates.
For this to be possible, Shamir came up with a three party paradigm. It
involves the two parties (A and B) who are communicating, and a Key Genera-
tion Center (KGC), who is responsible for providing A and B with their private
keys. The KGC derives the private keys from the readable public keys, and
must be the only party capable of doing so.
This type of system heavily relies on the trustworthiness of the KGC, since
it knows everyone’s private key, and on the viability of transferring private keys
to users using a secure channel (Shamir advocates smartcards).
Note that, under these assumptions, A and B will be able to communicate
securely using a single exchange, as soon as they are provided with their own
private keys.
The requirements for this type of scheme, as stated by Shamir, are the
following:
• In addition to the properties expected for any public key system,
• the KGC must be able to generate private keys efficiently from identities,
using a given master key, which it keeps secret;
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• not knowing this master key, it must be infeasible for any party to obtain
it, given an arbitrary number of key pairs and instances of the identity
based algorithm execution; and,
• not knowing this master key, it must also be infeasible to recover an agent’s
private key.
Is his original work, Shamir proposed a signature scheme that satisfies these
requirements (see Section 5.3). He was, however, unable to present a suitable
encryption scheme, and this was an open problem for a few years (see Sec-
tion 5.4).
5.2 Security Models
The security models defined in Section 2.2 are not applicable in an identity
based scenario, since the interactive key generation process may leak information
about the challenge.
Boneh and Franklin [11] presented an adapted version of the security model
for encryption in the identity based scenario. The goals of indistinguishability
and non-malleability have exactly the same meaning, but the attack models
must be refined:
• The attacker is given access to a private key generation oracle from which
she may obtain private keys for public keys of her choosing.
• The public key on which the adversary is challenged is of her choosing
(and obviously she may not ask the oracle for the corresponding private
key).
The security models for other identity based cryptographic primitives are
derived from their non-identity based counterparts using similar adaptations.
5.3 Signatures
The concept of an identity based signature, as a dual for identity based encryp-
tion must be taken with care. This is because the purpose of a digital signature is
authentication, and the escrow functionality inherent to identity-based systems
is somewhat unnatural in this context.
Basically, it is difficult to argue that a system in which the signer must
contact a Key Generation Center (KGC) to obtain is private signing key is any
use at all in terms of authentication. At any time the KGC can generate valid
signatures on behalf of the signer without any possibility of this being detected.
This is somewhat different for identity based encryption, in which the private
key must only be derived when a decryption is going to take place, and where
key escrow functionality can actually be included as a desirable feature [25]. One
way to solve this is, of course, to resort to multiple key generation authorities
such that forgery is infeasible up to a threshold of colluding authorities.
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Public Parameters (n, e, f)
A RSA modulus n, a large number e relative
prime to φ(n), and a one way function f taking
two arguments.
KGC Master Key (p, q) The prime factorisation of n = p · q.
Priv. Key Extraction g = e
√
i (mod n)
The private key is the number g such that i = ge
(mod n), where i is the identity of the private
key owner. The security of the scheme relies on
the assumption that this calculation is only fea-
sible knowing the factorisation of n, which di-
rectly relates it to the security of RSA.
Signature (s, t)
First, one calculates t = re (mod n), where
r is a randomly generated number, and then
s = g · rf(t,m) (mod n). Again, the security
assumption is related to that of RSA e.g. se-
lecting t at random and calculating a suitable s
implies the factorisation of n.
Verification se = i · tf(m,t) (mod n) Because e is relative prime to n one can cancel itin the exponents on both sides of the equation.
Table 5.1: Shamir’s original identity based signature scheme
Public Parameters (G1, GT , eˆ, H1, H2, P, PPub)
Two cyclic groups of prime order q and a bilinear
map between them eˆ : G1×G1 → GT , such that
the one-more CDH problem is hard in G1. Two
hash functions H1 and H2 that take identity rep-
resentations and {0, 1}∗ × G1 × {0, 1}∗ tuples
into G1, respectively. A random generator P of
G1, and the KGC’s public key PPub ∈ G1.
KGC Master Key s
The discrete logarithm of PPub to the base P ,
or PPub = sP .
Priv. Key Extraction dID
Given a finite bit string representing the ID, the
private key is dID = sQID = sH1(ID).
Signature (Y, Z)
First, one calculates Y = yP , where y is a
randomly generated number, and then Z =
yH2(ID, Y,M) + dID .
Verification
eˆ(Z, P ) =
eˆ(H2(ID, Y,M), Y )
·eˆ(H1(ID), PPub)
From the pairing’s bilinearity.
Table 5.2: Sakai et al.’s pairing based and identity based signature scheme
The first identity based signature scheme was included in Shamir’s first work
on identity based cryptography [43], in 1985. It is a close relative of RSA, but
it was proposed informally, as an example, and no formal security claims were
stated for it. A description is included in Table 5.1 for reference purposes.
After Boneh and Franklin’s identity based encryption came out in 2001 [11],
several authors proposed signature schemes, operating on the same parameter
set, in order to provide a complete identity based PKI. Here we refer a few:
SOK-IBS by Sakai et al [40], CC-IBS by Cha and Cheon [14], the scheme by
Hess [25] and the scheme by Paterson [38].
In this report we will present the first three schemes as taken from Bellare
et al.’s [8] work on the provable security of identity based signature and iden-
tification schemes. This is particular important for the SOK-IBS scheme, since
it is modified to obtain improved security properties.
Table 5.2 shows the details of the SOK-IBS algorithm. In their original
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Public Parameters (G1, GT , eˆ, H1, H2, P, PPub)
Two cyclic groups of prime order q
and a bilinear map between them eˆ :
G1 × G1 → GT , such that the one-
more CDH problem is hard in G1. Two
hash functions H1 and H2 that take
identity representations into G1 and
{0, 1}∗ ×G2 × {0, 1}∗ tuples into Zq ,
respectively. A random generator P of
G1, and the KGC’s public key PPub ∈
G1.
KGC Master Key s
The discrete logarithm of PPub to the
base P , or PPub = sP .
Priv. Key Extraction dID
Given a finite bit string representing
the ID, the private key is dID =
sQID = sH1(ID).
Signature (α, Z)
First, one calculates α = eˆ(P, P )y ,
where y is a randomly generated num-
ber, and then
Z = dIDH2(ID, α,M) + yP.
Verification
eˆ(Z, P ) =
α · eˆ(H1(ID), PPub)H2(ID,Y,M)
From the pairing’s bilinearity.
Table 5.3: Hess’s pairing based and identity based signature scheme
work, Sakai et al. proposed this algorithm in a slightly different form: instead
of usingH2(Y,M) they simply usedH2(M). By introducing this change, Bellare
et al. were able to demonstrate that this scheme is UF-CMA secure under the
one-more CDH assumption in the RO model.
The one-more CDH assumption states that it is infeasible for an adversary
to gain advantage in a game in which it has access to a CDH oracle and a
challenge oracle. The goal of the game is to solve the CDH problem for at least
one more challenge than the queries made to the CDH oracle.
Libert and Quisquater [31] recently proved that, although it is less efficient,
this scheme provides better security guarantees than its counterparts for the
same security levels, since it allows for more efficient reductions to the underlying
security problem. These authors have also pointed out that this algorithm is
an identity based adaptation of a randomized version of Boneh et al.’s short
signatures described below.
Table 5.3 shows the identity based signature algorithm proposed by Hess
[25]. This scheme is also UF-CMA secure under the one-more CDH assumption
in the RO model [8].
Table 5.4 shows the identity based signature algorithm proposed by Cha
et al. [14]. This scheme is also UF-CMA secure under the one-more CDH
assumption in the RO model [8].
Table 5.5 shows the identity based signature algorithm proposed by Paterson
[38]. The security of this scheme is left in [8] as an open problem.
Finally, one of the most cited pairing-based algorithms is a short signature
algorithm by Boneh et al. (BLS) [12]. It is not identity-based, but it is included
here for reference purposes.
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Public Parameters (G1, GT , eˆ, H1, H2, P, PPub)
Two cyclic groups of prime order q
and a bilinear map between them
eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT , such that
the one-more CDH problem is hard
in G1. Two hash functions H1 and
H2 that take identity representa-
tions into G1 and {0, 1}∗ × G1 ×
{0, 1}∗ tuples into Zq , respectively.
A random generator P of G1, and
the KGC’s public key PPub ∈ G1.
KGC Master Key s
The discrete logarithm of PPub to
the base P , or PPub = sP .
Priv. Key Extraction dID
Given a finite bit string representing
the ID, the private key is dID =
sQID = sH1(ID).
Signature (Y, Z)
First, one calculates Y = yPPub,
where y is a randomly generated
number, and then
Z = dID(H2(ID, Y,M) + y).
Verification
eˆ(Z, P ) = eˆ(H1(ID), Y )
·eˆ(H1(ID), PPub)H2(ID,Y,M)
From the pairing’s bilinearity.
Table 5.4: Cha et al.’s pairing based and identity based signature scheme
Public Parameters (G1, GT , eˆ, H1, H2, P, PPub)
Two cyclic groups of prime order q
and a bilinear map between them eˆ :
G1×G1 → GT , such that the CDH
problem is hard. Three hash func-
tions H1, H2 and H3 that take iden-
tity representations into G1, mes-
sages into Zq , and elements of G1 to
Zq , respectively. A random genera-
tor P of G1, and the KGC’s public
key PPub ∈ G1.
KGC Master Key s
The discrete logarithm of PPub to
the base P , or PPub = sP .
Priv. Key Extraction dID
Given a finite bit string representing
the ID, the private key is dID =
sQID = sH1(ID).
Signature (Y, Z)
First, one calculates Y = yP , where
y is a randomly generated number,
and then
Z = y−1(dIDH3(Y ) + (H2(M)P ).
Verification
eˆ(Z, Y ) = eˆ(H1(ID), PPub)
H3(Y )
·eˆ(P, P )H2(M)
From the pairing’s bilinearity.
Table 5.5: Paterson’s pairing based and identity based signature scheme
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Public Parameters (G1, G2, GT , eˆ, H, P, PPub)
Three cyclic groups of prime order q and a bilin-
ear map between them eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT , such
that (G1, G2) is a gap-co-Diffie-Hellman pair. A
hash function H that takes n-bit-long messages
to G1. A random generator P of G2, and the
public key PPub ∈ G2.
Private Key x
The private key is the number x ∈ Zq such that
PPub = xP
Signature σ
The signature for a message M is calculated as
σ = x ·H(M).
Verification eˆ(σ, P ) = eˆ(H(M), PPub)
The verification procedure is trivial by the pair-
ing’s bilinearity.
Table 5.6: Boneh et al.’s short signature algorithm from pairings
The BLS algorithm is very simple. It is described as being based on a
co-Gap-Bilinear-Diffie-Hellman group, i.e. using asymmetric pairings, and we
present it in Table 5.6. The scheme is shown to be existential unforgeability
secure under an adaptive chosen message attack (UF-CMA), in the RO model.
The short-signature characteristic arises from the implementation that is
proposed by the authors. Note that the signature is a single element of G1. The
smallest the representation that can be found for such an element, the shorter
the resulting signatures.
Boneh et al. propose an implementation based on the Weil or the Tate
pairing over MNT elliptic curves, using embedding degree six 1.
Given that a signature is simply a point of the curve over the base field,
Boneh et al. relax the verification procedure in order to be able to use only the
x-coordinate of this point as signature. For this to be possible, the verification
process must accept signatures generated by σ or −σ. By the bilinearity prop-
erty of the pairing, this just means that you must test for the inverse as well.
Using this observation, this algorithm produces signatures of 160 bits, at the
same security level as an El Gamal signature of 320 bits, and an RSA signature
of 1024 bits.
5.4 Encryption
In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [11] published a paper describing an identity based
encryption scheme based on the Weil Pairing. This was ground breaking, since
it had been a few years since Shamir [43] had identified the problem, and left it
open. The system was also ground breaking because it confirmed the potential
of pairings to be used for “good” in the construction of cryptographic schemes,
and not just as a cryptanalysis tool.
The identity based encryption scheme in [11] works over any bilinear map
eˆ : G1 ×G1 → GT between two groups G1 and GT .
1Supersingular curves of characteristic three are also recognised to be a solution, but said
not to be an optimal solution for bandwith saving since Coppersmith’s DLP method means
longer bit-lengths are required for the field extensions.
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Public Parameters (G1, GT , eˆ, H1, H2, P, PPub)
Two cyclic groups of prime order q and a bilinear
map between them eˆ : G1×G1 → GT , such that
the BDH problem is hard. Two hash functions
H1 and H2 that take identity representations to
G1, and elements of GT into the n-bit-long mes-
sage space, respectively. A random generator P
of G1, and the KGC’s public key PPub ∈ G1.
KGC Master Key s
The discrete logarithm of PPub to the base P ,
or PPub = sP .
Priv. Key Extraction dID
Given a finite bit string representing the ID, the
private key is dID = sQID = sH1(ID).
Encryption (y1, y2)
A pair,in which the first element y1 = rP
hides a random r ∈ Z∗q , and the second element
y2 = M⊕H2(grID)) masks the plain text with a
hashed version of gID = eˆ(QID, PPub), to the
power r.
Decryption M = y2 ⊕H2(grID)
Where the mask is reconstructed from grID =
eˆ(y1, dID)
Table 5.7: Boneh and Franklin’s identity based encryption scheme
The proofs of security presented by the authors for the following schemes
are given in the random oracle model, under the assumption that the BDHP is
hard.
Table 5.7 shows a simplified version of the algorithm, which is shown to be
OWE secure.
The complete identity based encryption algorithm described in [11] corre-
sponds to a transformed version of the one-way secure encryption scheme. The
complete version provides IND-ID-CCA2 security, and the transformation is the
one in [18].
The concrete imlementation proposed by Boneh and Franklin goes as follows:
• The elliptical curve used is a y2 = x3 + 1 over Fp, with p = 2 (mod 3),
which is supersingular with embedding degree k = 2. The number of
points in the curve is #E(Fp) = p+ 1.
• The group of points of order q = (p + 1)/l in E/Fp is used as group G1,
where q is a large prime factor of the curve order but q2 does not divide
it2.
• A non-trivial root of x2 − 1, ζ ∈ Fp2 is used to build a distortion map
φ(x, y) = (ζx, y), that for each point in G1 permits finding a linear inde-
pendent point in E/Fp2 , of the same order q.
• The bilinear map is built from the Weil pairing, and this is used in the
transformed version, eˆ(P, φ(Q)), with P,Q ∈ G1, which is non-degenerate.
• Group GT is the subgroup of order q of F∗p2 , which is isomorphic to the
subgroup of Z2p that contains all the qth roots of unity.
2This condition guarantees that E[q] * E(Fp).
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• Hashing from identities into G1 is achieved by taking advantage of an
interesting property of this curve. The y coordinates of its points span
all of Zp, i.e. for each y ∈ Zp there is only one point that has this
y-coordinate, and this point has x-coordinate x = (y2 − 1)1/3. Hence,
hashing is performed in two steps. First the identity is hashed into Zp,
and this value is taken as y-coordinate of the target point. An x-coordinate
is then easily calculated as x = (y2 − 1)(2p−1)/3. The resulting point is
not known to be of order q, therefore it is multiplied by l = (p + 1)/q to
produced the desired point in G1.
• Hashing from GT into the message space is straightforward.
Curiously, around the same time the Boneh and Franklin scheme was pub-
lished, Cocks [15] published another identity based encryption algorithm that
solved the same problem. We don’t discuss it here, as it it is not pairing based.
Since 2001, many pairing based encryption algorithm variants have been
proposed. Here we will mention only two: Libert and Quisquater’s identity
based signcryption algorithm [30], and Boyen’s swiss army knife multipurpose
identity based cryptosystem [13].
The concept of signcryption was proposed in 1997 by Zheng [47] as a primi-
tive that combines the functionality of a digital signature and encryption scheme
(integrity, authentication, nonrepudiation and confidentiality) at a much lower
cost than separately conducting these operations one after the other. Sign-
cryption schemes are made out for algorithms: Setup, Key Generation, Sign-
cryptionand Unsigncryption, where the latter returns bottom (⊥) in case of a
verification error.
The security model for the signcryption primitive is a combination of the
models for encryption and digital signatura. In the case of identity based
signcryption, the important security notions are semantical security against an
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, and existential unforgeability against a cho-
sen message attack. The only difference in this latter case, is that instead of
producing a valid message/signature pair, the adversary must produce a valid
signcryption message [33].
Libert and Quisquater’s identity based signcryption scheme is described in
Table 5.8 It is proven to be IND-CCA2 secure (in its identity based variant) in
the RO model, and under the assumption that the Decision BDH problem is
hard. Since it is based in Hess’s identity based signature scheme [25], it is also
UF-CMA secure in the RO model, under the CDH assumption.
Boyen’s work [13] takes a more general approach to the signcryption problem.
The author proposes a set of cryptographic algorithms that allow for efficient
identity based digital signatures, encryption and signcryption, over a common
set of global parameters. The primitives that comprise the scheme are: Setup,
Private key extraction, Signature, Encryption, Decryption and Verification.
This author also proposes a broader security model, that elliminates am-
biguities in the interactions between the different primitives. The important
concepts are:
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Public Parameters (G1, GT , eˆ, Hi, P, PPub)
Two cyclic groups of prime order q and a bilin-
ear map between them eˆ : G1 ×G1 → GT , such
that the DBDH problem is hard. Three hash
functions H1, H2 and H3 that take identity rep-
resentations to G1, arbitrary bit strings to Z∗q ,
and elements of GT into the n-bit-long message
space, respectively. A random generator P of
G1, and the KGC’s public key PPub ∈ G1
KGC Master Key s
The discrete logarithm of PPub to the base P ,
or PPub = sP .
Priv. Key Extraction dID
Given a finite bit string representing the ID, the
private key is dID = sQID = sH1(ID).
Signcryption C = (U, V, c)
U = xP , with x random, r = H2(U||m),
V = xPPub + r ∗ dIDA ,
c = m ⊕H3(eˆ(PPub,QIDB )
x)
Unsigncryption m or ⊥
m = c ⊕H3(eˆ(U, dIDB )), r = H2(U||m)
if eˆ(V, P ) = eˆ(QIDA
, PPub)
reˆ(U, PPub)
then m else ⊥
Table 5.8: Libert and Quisquater’s identity based signcryption scheme
• message confidentiality – the formal definition is similar to IND-CCA2,
in its identity based variant, but with insider security. This means that
the adversary knows the private key associated with the signing identity.
• signature non-repudiation – the formal definition is relative only to the
cleartext message, and is equivaltent toEUF-CMA in an identity based
setting. Again, for insider-security, the adversary knows the recipient’s
private key.
• ciphertext unlinkability – this guarantees that non-repudiation applies
only to the cleartext message, and not to the ciphertext. The formal
definition requires only that it is easy to construct a valid ciphertext that
is indistinguishable from a challenge cryphertext for which the encrypted
signature and message are known.
• ciphertext authentication – this, in combination with the previous
property, means that the encryption scheme includes MAC-like function-
ality. The formal definition is relative to the whole ciphertext, and it is
based on UF-CMA with outsider security i.e. the adversary does not know
the recipient’s private key.
• ciphertext anonymity – this means that only the legitimate recipient
can find out who the sender is. The formal definition is based on an
IND-CCA2-like game, where the adversary must choose between sender
identities, rather than cleartexts.
The details of the scheme are shown in Table 5.9. Boyen also provides an
intuitive description of the scheme:
• The signature is a pair, where j is a commitment to a random r, and v is
a value that depends on both r and the message m.
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Public Parameters (G1, GT , eˆ, H0..H4, P, PPub)
Two cyclic groups of prime order q and a bilinear
map between them eˆ : G1×G1 → GT , such that
the BDH problem is hard. Five hash functions:
H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1, H1 : G∗1 × {0, 1}∗ → F∗q ,
H2 : G
∗
T → {0, 1}
blog pc, H3 : G∗T → F
∗
q and
H4 : G
∗
1 → {0, 1}∗. A random generator P of
G1, and the KGC’s public key PPub ∈ G1.
KGC Master Key s
The discrete logarithm of PPub to the base P ,
or PPub = sP .
Priv. Key Extraction dID
Given a finite bit string representing the ID, the
private key is dID = sQID = sH0(ID).
Sign S = 〈(j, v); r〉
j = rQIDA
, with r random, h = H1(j,m)
v = dr+h
IDA
, where (j, v) is the signature, and r
is passed on to subsequent stages.
Encrypt (x, y, z)
u = eˆ(dIDA
,QIDB
), k = H3(u),
x = jk, w = ukr , y = H2(w) ⊕ v
z = H4(v) ⊕ (IDA||m)
Decrypt (IDA, mˆ, jˆ, vˆ)
wˆ = eˆ(x, dIDB
), vˆ = H2(wˆ) ⊕ yˆ,
(IDA||mˆ) = zˆ ⊕H4(vˆ), uˆ = eˆ(QIDA, dIDB )
kˆ = H3(uˆ), jˆ = xˆ
kˆ−1 .
Verify > or ⊥
hˆ = H1(jˆ, mˆ)
if eˆ(P, vˆ) = eˆ(PPub, jˆ · QhˆIDA )
then > else ⊥
Table 5.9: Boyen’s identity based swiss army knife signcryption scheme
• Encryption is performed in two layers.
• The inner layer encrypts j, the commitment, into x using a basic key
agreement that uses the sender’s private key and the recipient’s public
key.
• The outer layer encrypts signature and the bit string comprised of the
sender’s identity and the message itself into y and z respectively. y is
obtained using an identity based encryption mechanism using pairings,
but re-using the randomization of r. z is obtained masking the cleartext
with an image of the signature component v.
This scheme is proven to be secure with respect to all the requirements layed
out above, in the RO model, and under the BDH hardness assumption.
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Chapter 6
Recent Developments
6.1 Koblitz and Menezes, 2005
In [28], Koblitz and Menezes discuss the future of pairing based cryptography.
This is done taking into account an increase in the security standards for public
key cryptosystems that, in their view, is to be expected in order to achieve
security levels equivalent to 128-, 192-, or 256-bit AES keys.
The main problems with pairing based cryptography pointed out in this
work are the following:
• The fact that the DLP problem must be hard in the target group means
that qk (with q the size of the field underlying the elliptic curve, and k
embedding degree of the curve) must be approximately the size of an RSA
module which, at high security levels, can be very large (at least 15360
bits for security equivalent to 256-bit AES). This is very costly in terms
of efficiency.
• The BDHP is a new problem. The assumption that it is hard is essencial
to the security claims in most pairing-based protocols. So far there is no
evidence that this problem is not easier than the DH and DL problems in
the source elliptic curve. Similarly, no evidence exists that the BDHP is
not easier than the DHP in the finite field Fqk . If anything, the evidence
points in the opposite direction. For example, Koblitz and Menezes point
out that if, as a consequence of a theorem by Verheul [29], if the BDHP
is ever proven to be equivalent to the DHP in Fqk , then this will render
both problems easy.
The estimated parameter sizes for pairing based cryptosystems at high se-
curity levels, are shown in Table 6.1. They are calculated based on the required
sizes for the target field and the source sub-group, in order to achieve a particular
security level. Note that, in typical applications of pairing-based crytography,
we will have k approximately equal to the ratio between qk and r (also shown
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Security level 80-bit AES 128-bit AES 192-bit AES 256-bit AES
r bit-length 160 256 384 512
pk bit-length 1024 3072 8192 15360
rk/r ratio 6.4 12 21.33 30
Table 6.1: Koblitz and Menezes’ estimates for required parameter sizes at high
security levels.
in Table 6.1) for optimal performance. This is the case, for example in the BLS
short signatures discussed in Section 5.3.
Koblitz and Menezes draw the following conclusions from this data:
• For higher efficiency, both q and r should be Solinas primes. Therefore,
there is a need for curve generation methods that achieve the desired
values for k under this constraint for high security levels. No such method
exists for supersingular curves, for k ≥ 2 (apart from a result by Barreto
et al. [4] that produces near-optimal solutions for 128-bit security).
• For the higher security levels, and k 6= 2, it is not advisable to use super-
singular curves, since the number of choices for the embedding degree are
small, and it may simply not be possible to find a suitable curve.
• At high security levels, there is a threshold, above which the additional
exponentiations required by the Tate pairing render it less efficient than
the Weil pairing.
• Curves with an embedding degree of one have never been seriously con-
sidered for pairing-based systems, but they constitute a valid solution.
Koblitz and Menezes propose a family of curves with k = 1, for which it is
possible to find satisfactory curves at high security levels. They have the
disadvantage, however, that the arithmetic must be done in large fields,
for which there are no efficiency shortcuts.
• For k = 2, supersingular curver provide highly efficient solutions for pair-
ing based systems, and there is no fundament to rule them out as not
secure.
• For k > 2 it is advisable to stick to curves over fields Fq, where the field
extension Fqk is a pairing-friendly field. This means that q = 1 (mod 12),
and k is of the form 2i3j . The structure of this type of field permits
constructing the extension as a tower of quadratic and cubic extensions
which, in turn, allows for significant speed-ups in multiplications over the
full extension.
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6.2 Smart and Vercauteren, 2005
In [45], Smart and Vercautered present a clarification of two issues that are
critical in pairing based systems: the hard problems underlying pairing-based
systems, and the need for a computable isomorphism between the source groups
of the pairing. In their work, these authors focus on the general case of an
asymmetric pairing pˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT , and base their definitions on the notion
of a pairing problem instance: Γ = (q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, pˆ), where q is the
(prime) order of the groups, and Pi are generators for groups Gi.
The hard problems that Smart and Verceuteren identify, based on a partic-
ular pairing problem instance Γ, are variations of the Bilinear Diffie Hellman
problem and Computational Diffie Hellman problem:
• BDHi,j,k problem: Given Γ and i, j, k ∈ 1, 2, and also aPi, bPj and cPk,
with a, b, c ∈ Fq, compute pˆ(P1, P2)abc.
• co − BDHj,k problem: Given Γ and j, k ∈ 1, 2, and also aP1, aP2, bPj
and cPk, with a, b, c ∈ Fq, compute pˆ(P1, P2)abc.
• BDHφi,j,k problem: Given Γ and i, j, k ∈ 1, 2, and also aPi, bPj and
cPk, with a, b, c ∈ Fq, compute pˆ(P1, P2)abc. The difference to BDHi,j,k is
that the adversary has access to an oracle which computes an isomorphism
φ : G2 → G1 (but not necessarily φ−1).
• CDHi,j,k problem: Given Γ and i, j, k ∈ 1, 2, and also aPi and bPj, with
a, b ∈ Fq, compute cPk.
• CDHφi,j,k problem: Given Γ and i, j, k ∈ 1, 2, and also aPi, bPj and cPk,
with a, b, c ∈ Fq, compute pˆ(P1, P2)abc. Again, the difference to CDHi,j,k
is that the adversary has access to an oracle which computes an isomor-
phism φ : G2 → G1 (but not necessarily φ−1).
The ways in which these problems relate to each other are not obvious:
• In the presence of a computable isomorphism, the BDHi,j,k and the
BDHφi,jk problems are equivalent. In its absence, the former is at least as
hard as the latter.
• Instances of BDHi,j,k where i+ j + k are the same (the number of points
taken from each group is the same) are obviously equivalent. There ap-
pears to be no relationship between instances of this problem where the
permutations differ.
• In the case of BDHφi,j,k, the situation is similar, apart from the fact that
the availability if the isomorphism oracle permits mapping points of G2
onto G1. This implies that instances where i+ j + k is smaller (i.e. more
points taken from G1) are at least as hard as permutations with higher
i+ j + k.
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• For co−BDHj,k, since we have the two powers of a in both groups, it is
easy to see that it is not harder than BDHi,j,k. On the other hand, it is
at least as hard as BDHφ2,j,k.
• Relations between the CDH variants are similar to the previous ones.
• Finally, the CDHi,j,k problem is at least as hard as the BDHi,j,k′ problem,
as long as k 6= k′. This is because if we are able to calculate abPk and cPk′
in different groups, then the pairing gives us the solution to BDHi,j,k.
A similar approach can be taken to defining underlying gap-Diffie-Hellman
variants.
These definitions allow for a more general analysis of pairing based cryp-
tosystems. Namely they permit defining at a higher level of abstraction what
are the restrictions on groups G1 and G2, and taking implementation decisions
based on that. The authors present such an analysis for Boneh et al.’s identity
based encryption scheme [11] and Boneh et al.’s short signature scheme [12],
which exposes the essence of these cryptosystems, and explores the different
implementation options that they allow for.
The need for a computable isomorphism between G2 and G1 is said to arise
mostly in security proofs. On the other hand, Smart and Vercauteren point
out that, for the most promising Tate pairing implementation (Barreto et al.’s
work on MNT curves [2]) such a computable isomorphism does not exist. It
is therefore still an open problem to find an efficient pairing implementation,
suitable for cryptographic applications, that meets all the requirements imposed
by the pairing based cryptographic schemes in literature.
In addition to computable isomorphisms, there is another restriction on these
groups that is very important for cryptographic applications: whether a group
is randomly samplable. This means that it is possible to randomly choose an
element of the group without using a power of the generator (i.e. not knowing
its discrete log). Only under this condition is it possible to obtain hash functions
that map onto these groups.
Smart and Vercauteren propose a new choice for group G2 that will allow
for both a computable isomorphism and an efficient MNT-curve-based imple-
mentation. However, this group requires a larger representation, and appears
not to be randomly samplable.
6.3 Barreto and Naehrig, 2005
Barreto and Naehrig [3] propose a surprisingly simple method of constructing
MNT curves of prime order with embedding degree 12. This is significant for
schemes such as the BLS short signatures where the size of the underlying field
must be kept to a minimum. With an embedding degree of 12 it is possible to
setup a set of parameters providing 128-bit security working over a base field
size of 256 bits, and an extension field size of 3072 bits. This optimizes the
bandwidth/security ratio. In fact, every pairing based cryptographic protocol
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implemented over this type of set-up would benefit from the decrease in param-
eter sizes (this would be noticeable in all parameters except the extended field
size).
The problem with this method is that one can not control the Hamming
weight of the system parameters, namely the curve order. This severely limits
the efficiency that can be achieved in pairing calculations, even though the
proposed curves allow for the usual Tate pairing calculation optimizations, as
well as elliptic curve point and pairing value compression techniques.
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